India’s Strategic Shift: The Rise of the Shaktibaan Regiments

The Indian Army has officially embarked on a significant structural and technological overhaul with the introduction of 15 to 20 Shaktibaan Regiments. Operating under the Regiment of Artillery, these units are designed to integrate advanced drone technology, loitering munitions, and swarm capabilities into the heart of India’s land forces. This move, spearheaded under the leadership of Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi, signals a departure from traditional artillery reliance toward a hybrid model of “precision-strike” warfare

Bridging the Tactical Gap

Historically, the Indian Army has faced a “capability gap” in its ability to strike targets with precision at ranges between 50 and 500 kilometers. While traditional Bofors or M777 howitzers handle short-range tactical support, and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles manage long-range strategic targets, the mid-range zone often requires expensive missile launches or high-risk aerial sorties. The Shaktibaan Regiments aim to fill this vacuum. By utilizing loitering munitions often called “suicide drones” the Army can now loiter over a battlefield, identify high-value targets in real-time, and strike with surgical precision. These regiments will operate a tiered range of systems:

• Short-range (5–50 km): Tactical swarm drones for immediate battlefield support.
• Medium-to-Long range (50–500 km): High-endurance UAVs and loitering munitions capable of deep penetration behind enemy lines.

Domestic Procurement and the “Atmanirbhar” Push

A cornerstone of this initiative is the reliance on indigenous defense manufacturing. The Ministry of Defense is reportedly fast-tracking the procurement of approximately 850 loitering munitions. Contracts are being channeled through Indian defense giants and startups alike, including:

• Solar Defense and Aerospace
• Adani Defense
• RapheM

This synergy between the military and the private sector is intended to ensure a steady supply chain that is not susceptible to international sanctions or foreign supply disruptions. Furthermore, the Shaktibaan units will work in tandem with newly formed Divyastra batteries, which are expected to provide additional layering to India’s “sensor-to-shooter” grid.

Integration with Existing Assets

Shakti Baan units will complete firepower synergies with existing systems instead of replacing them. Shakti Baan units operate with Pinaka MBRL and BrahMos missile systems. In a modern conflict scenario, Shakti Baan regiments’ drone units could conduct tactical reconnaissance and designate targets for BrahMos strikes, or they may destroy “soft” targets, such as radar and command centers, while leaving the heavy ordnance for bunkers to be reinforced.

 Challenges of a Drone-First Doctrine

While the Shakti Baan formation is indeed a positive initiative it can be questioned when considering the nature of modern warfare and where Shakti Baan will be deployed.

1. The “Nagorno-Karabakh” Lesson vs. Peer Competitors: Shakti Baan’s formation is a direct consequence of the conflict seen with drones in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. Such a critique must include Electronic Warfare (EW). In the context of drone units, most of the danger in the troop-less battle space is signal jamming, GPS spoofing, and EW countermeasures, and not the loss of drones; while Shakti Baan would not, as of now, appear to possess any counter-jamming technologies to protect and augment tactical command units, most of the 850+ munitions could become combat ineffective in mere minutes after tactical deployment in a high intensity conflict.

2. The Logistics of Mass Managing 15-20 specific regiments entails a major restructuring of specialized training. The Indian Army has historically been a “boots-on-the-ground” army. Moving towards a more digitized framework with more joystick-and-screen interfaces will require a cultural reorientation. There is a danger that procurement of new systems may proceed faster than the development of the necessary operational and maintenance training for the personnel.

3. Integration Complexity The addition of “Divyastra batteries” and “Shaktibaan Regiments” to the already congested Regiment of Artillery complicates the overall command and control. Managing communications for these drone systems with the Air Force and other traditional artillery systems to prevent “friendly fire” and airspace congestion is a complex joint services problem and will require

The Shaktibaan initiative is a necessary evolution. It acknowledges that the era of “dumb” artillery shells is fading. However, the success of these regiments will not be measured by the number of drones they possess, but by their ability to survive in a contested electromagnetic environment.

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